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Abstract—Various in-browser privacy protection techniques
have been designed to protect end-users from third-party track-
ing. In an arms race against these counter-measures, the tracking
providers developed a new technique called CNAME cloaking
based tracking to avoid issues with browsers that block third-
party cookies and requests. To detect this tracking technique,
browser extensions require on-demand DNS lookup APIs. This
feature is however only supported by the Firefox browser.
In this paper, we propose a supervised machine learning-based
method to detect CNAME cloaking-based tracking without the
on-demand DNS lookup. Our goal is to detect both sites and
requests linked to CNAME cloaking-related tracking. We crawl a
list of target sites and store all HTTP/HTTPS requests with their
attributes. Then we label all instances automatically by looking
up CNAME record of subdomain, and applying wildcard match-
ing based on well-known tracking filter lists. After extracting
features, we build a supervised classification model to distinguish
site and request related to CNAME cloaking-based tracking. Our
evaluation shows that the proposed approach outperforms well-
known tracking filter lists: F1 scores of 0.790 for sites and 0.885
for requests. By analyzing the feature permutation importance,
we demonstrate that the number of scripts and the proportion of
XMLHttpRequests are discriminative for detecting sites, and the
length of URL request is helpful in detecting requests. Finally, we
analyze concept drift by using the 2018 dataset to train a model
and obtain a reasonable performance on the 2020 dataset for
detecting both sites and requests using CNAME cloaking-based
tracking.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are several reasons websites intend to track user’s
browsing activities. In some acceptable cases, it is simply to
make the user browsing experience faster and more convenient.
On the other hand, user’s browsing activities are also used to
determine user browsing habits and preferences for advertise-
ment and analytics on the web, which can be frightful for
privacy-sensitive users [1].
Aiming to capture the economic value of user browsing
habit through tracking, many entities design services to collect
user’s information, even without any user’s knowledge or con-
sent [2] [3] [4]. There are some effective approaches against
third-party tracking for user’s privacy-preserving. Ad-blocking
and third-party tracking protections have been successfully
preventing such trackers using blacklist [5] [6] [7], machine
learning-based detection [8] [9], and others [10] [11] [12].
However, third-party web tracking has been getting more
sophisticated in an arms race against these counter-measures.
One of the current trends is the exploitation of Canonical
Name Record or Alias (CNAME) record in DNS, to bypass the
filter lists in browsers and extensions. This technique, called
CNAME cloaking-based tracking, uses CNAME to disguise
requests to a third-party tracker as first-party ones. The current
counter-measures mainly focus on third-party tracking and
do not impact first-party resources, CNAME cloaking-based
tracking can thus bypass this blocking.
There are some existing methods to detect CNAME
cloaking-based tracking. EasyPrivacy [13], AdGuard tracking
protection [14], and other filter lists manually add new first
party subdomains which are fronts for CNAME cloaking
to these blacklists. However, this approach will dramatically
increase the size of the blacklists and these subdomains need
to be updated frequently. Besides that, uBlock Origin since
version 1.24.1b0 performs a DNS lookup of the hostname
loading a resource to determine if the underlying subdomain is
related to CNAME cloaking or not. Nevertheless, only Firefox
allows uBlock Origin to block CNAME cloaking because the
other browsers do not support DNS resolution API [7].
In this paper, we propose a machine learning approach to
detect CNAME cloaking-based tracking on the web without
dynamic DNS lookup. Our method consists of three steps. (1)
We crawl a list of target sites and store all HTTP requests with
their attributes. Then we look up CNAME record of subdo-
mains, and label all instances by applying wildcard matching
based on well-known tracking filter lists on this CNAME
records (§ III-B). (2) Next, we extract their features (§ III-C).
(3) Finally, we build a supervised classification model to
distinguish sites and requests using CNAME cloaking-based
tracking (§ III-D).
The contributions of this study are summarized as follows:
• We propose an effective method to detect CNAME
cloaking-based tracking. We obtain a F1 score of 0.790
for detecting CNAME cloaking sites and of 0.885 for
requests (§ IV-A).
• We introduce site-related and request-related features for
CNAME cloaking detection (§ III-C). We also make
a detailed analysis about the discriminative power of
features regarding CNAME cloaking-based tracking de-
tection (§ IV-B).
• We show that our supervised model also works against
newly crawled data by analyzing concept drift (§ IV-C).
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Background
1) Browser-based privacy protection techniques: Several
browser-based privacy protections have been designed to pro-
tect end-users from third-party tracking, such as Ghostery [5],
Disconnect [6], and uBlock Origin [7]. They work effectively
to detect third-party tracking.
Fig. 1. Overview of CNAME cloaking-based tracking.
2) CNAME cloaking-based tracking: The usage of DNS
CNAME records coupled with Content Delivery Network is
increasingly commonplace to improve site load times, re-
duce bandwidth costs, and increase content availability and
redundancy. CNAME has also been used for user tracking.
Tracking providers ask their clients to delegate a subdomain
for data collection and tracking, and link it to an external
server using a CNAME DNS record [15]. It behaves differently
from ordinary third-party tracking because it uses the first-
party subdomains; browsers and extensions generally do not
impact these resources.
For example, when end-users access a site example.com,
this site embeds a first-party tracker a.example.com, which
points to a tracking provider tracker.com via the CNAME
metric.tracker.com. Tracking provider tracker.com thus track
activities of end-users on the site example.com (Figure 1).
B. Term definitions
1) Request linked to CNAME cloaking-related tracking:
An HTTP request by a subdomain is used for collecting, and
sharing information about a particular user’s activities on the
web by using CNAME cloaking-based tracking.
2) Site with CNAME cloaking-related tracking occurring:
A site sets up a subdomain that points to a tracking provider
domain using a CNAME record.
C. Related work
1) Anti third-party tracking techniques: The privacy haz-
ards of online web tracking have been studied extensively.
Machine learning-based tracking detection: Harass et al. [9]
develop an unsupervised detection method that inspects URL
queries in HTTP(S) requests to detect tracking activities.
Yamada et al. [16] analyze traffic at the network gateway to
monitor all tracking sites in the administrative network and
constructs a graph between sites and their visited time to detect
tracking sites. Wu et al. [8] develop DMTrackerDetector which
automatically detects third-party trackers offline to efficiently
generate blacklists using structural hole theory and supervised
machine learning.
Non-machine learning-based tracking detection: Schelter
and Kunegis [17] perform a large-scale analysis of third-party
trackers by extracting third-party embeddings from more than
41 million domains to study global online tracking. Roesner
et al. [11] develop a client-side method for detecting and
classifying five kinds of third-party trackers on the 500 most
popular and 500 less popular sites according to the Alexa
ranking. To cut off the tracking chain of third-party web
tracking, Pan et al. [12] develop TrackingFree which isolates
unique identifiers into different browser principals so that
the identifiers still exist but are not unique among different
websites.
2) Existing in-browser CNAME cloaking-based tracking de-
tection techniques: In order to block first-party trackers using
CNAME records, uBlock Origin resolves the hostname of a
DNS record to determine if an underlying subdomain is related
to CNAME cloaking or not. However, only Firefox with DNS
API allows uBlock Origin to block the CNAME cloaking
[7]. Besides that, the well-know tracking filter lists make an
continuous effort to manually update first-party subdomains
which are fronts for CNAME cloaking to these blacklists.
It makes day-to-day filter lists updating tedious and time-
consuming.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Here, we describe our method to detect CNAME cloaking-
based tracking.
A. Method overview
Fig. 2. Processing flow.
Our goal is to develop a CNAME cloaking-based tracking
detection method using machine learning. Our method flags
sites and requests related to CNAME cloaking-based tracking.
As shown in Figure 2, the method consists of four steps:
data collection, feature extraction, model development, and
evaluation.
1) Crawl the target sites, including sites with and without
CNAME cloaking based tracking, and save all the HTTP
requests and their attributes. Then we perform DNS
lookup for all subdomains, and label all instances au-
tomatically by matching well-known tracking filter lists
with CNAME behind all subdomain as described in [18].
These instances are divided into two sets, which we call
the tracker set and the non-tracker set (§ III-B).
2) Extract features for sites and requests (§ III-C).
3) Check the F1 score of 10 classification algorithms us-
ing 10-fold stratified cross-validation. After evaluating
performance, we select some effective classification al-
gorithms for hyper-parameter tuning phase, and combine
conceptually different machine learning classification
algorithms to build a model (§ III-D).
4) Evaluate the models with the testing data (§ IV).
B. Data collection
1) Finding CNAME cloaking-based tracking with blacklists:
We present our method to label CNAME cloaking-based
tracking. Firstly, we perform DNS queries for CNAME answer
set on all subdomains of each site. Then, we apply wildcard
matching based on well-known tracking filter lists to each
resolved CNAME in order to detect CNAME cloaking base
tracking. More specifically, we select third-party tracking
domains and international third-party tracking domains from
Easy privacy list [19] and tracking servers list from AdGuard
tracking protection filter [14] as of April 26, 2020. This
approach was used in the previous work [18].
2) Datasets: We use OpenWPM [20] with vanilla Firefox
in April 2020 to crawl 1,762 sites from Alexa Top 300k
where CNAME cloaking-based tracking was previously de-
tected [18]. We also crawl 1,762 sites that were randomly
picked from all sites without CNAME cloaking-based tracking
[18]. The stored data is all HTTP/HTTPS requests and their
responses for each site. Then, applying the method (§ III-B1)
to the stored crawled data, we find that 4,047 HTTP requests
in 1,532 sites used CNAME cloaking-based tracking1.
We also rely on another dataset crawled on Alexa Top
100K sites using OpenWPM [20] in April 2018. We check
the historical forward DNS (FDNS) datasets provided by
Rapid7 [21], and apply the methodology in § III-B1 to detect
CNAME cloaking-based tracking in this historical data. We
find that 2,546 HTTP requests in 1,005 sites are related to
CNAME cloaking-based tracking. We also use 1,005 addi-
tional randomly picked sites without CNAME-cloaking from
this dataset to analyze concept drift in § IV-C. The details of
the 2020 dataset and the 2018 dataset are listed in Table I.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF DATA: 2,010 SITES IN 2018 AND 3,524 SITES IN 2020.
Metrics 2018 2020
3rd party requests 185,896 (62.2%) 276,686 (63.8%)
1st party requests domain 60,278 (20.2%) 120,689 (27.8%)
subdomain 52,476 (17.6%) 36,399 (8.4%)
Total requests 298,649 (100%) 433,774 (100%)
Total sites 2,010 3,524
C. Feature extraction
We experimentally extract the following features related to
sites and requests.
1The dataset is available at https://github.com/fukuda-lab/cname-cloaking
1) Site with CNAME cloaking-related tracking occurring:
• num url: The total number of HTTP requests in a site.
• num 1st: The total number of first-party requests in a
site.
• num 3rd: The total number of third-party requests in a
site.
• pct script call: The proportion of fingerprinting-related
method calls in a site.
• pct xhr: The proportion of XMLHttpRequest in a site,
which is a built-in browser object that can be used to
make HTTP requests in JavaScript to exchange data
between the web browser and the server.
• pct 3rd window: The proportion of requests originating
from a third-party DOM window in the window hierarchy
[22].
• ranking: The site ranking according to the Alexa ranking
[23].
• country: The site country based on Free IP Geolocation
API [24].
• category: The site category according to the FortiGuard
Web Filtering [25] dataset in April 2020.
2) Request linked to CNAME cloaking-related tracking:
• method: The desired action to be performed for given
request.
• is xhr: The request uses an API that provides scripted
client functionality for transferring data between a client
and a server.
• content type: The HTML tag that resulted in a request,
such as image, javascript or document, which are defined
in this IDL [22].
• len url: The length of request URL.
• len sub: The subdomain length of request.
• len prefix sub: The subdomain prefix length of request.
• num prefix sub: The number of subdomain prefixes.
• prefix sub blacklist: The subdomain prefix is among sub-
domain prefixes in tracking filter lists [14] [19].
• is sub dic: The prefix of subdomain is a word in English
dictionary.
• entropy url: The randomness of request URL by calcu-
lating the metric entropy from request URL.
• entropy sub: The randomness of subdomain by calculat-
ing the metric entropy from subdomain.
• entropy prefix sub: The randomness of subdomain prefix
by calculating the metric entropy from subdomain prefix.
D. Modeling and preliminary results
First of all, we split the 2020 dataset (Table I) into testing
data and training data. The percentage of the data held over
for testing is 20%. It is used in § IV-A to evaluate our model.
Next, we describe how to build a classification model to detect
CNAME cloaking-based tracking using testing data (80% of
the 2020 dataset).
1) Model cross-validation: We randomly split the training
dataset into 10 smaller sets (folds) without replacement, where
nine folds are used for the model training and the remaining
one fold is for validating. After obtaining 10 performance
estimates by repeating this procedure ten times, we take their
average as the final performance estimate. We then compare 10
classification algorithms and evaluate their F1 score using this
stratified cross-validation procedure on the training data (80%
the dataset 2020). We employ 10 supervised classification
algorithms with scikit-learn module (random state = 2 with
default parameters):
• Support Vector Classification (SVC)
• Decision Tree
• AdaBoost
• Random Forest
• Extra Trees
• Gradient Boosting
• Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP)
• K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
• Logistic Regression
• Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA)
We use the F1 score for evaluating the performance of the
classifiers. Larger values of the F1 score (≈ 1.0) indicate
better performance, and lower values (≈ 0) correspond to
worse performance. Figure 3(a) shows the F1 scores for the
10 selected algorithms using 10-fold stratified cross-validation
in the 2020 dataset for detecting sites with CNAME cloaking-
related tracking occurring. All classification algorithms have
a different detection performance. The most effective clas-
sification algorithms are Random Forest, Extra Trees, and
Gradient Boosting, while Support Vector Classification, Multi-
layer Perceptron, and K-nearest Neighbor achieve moderate
performances for this dataset.
Figure 3(b) shows the F1 scores for detecting requests
linked to CNAME cloaking-related tracking. The most effec-
tive classification algorithms are Random Forest and Extra
Trees, while SVC shows the worst performance.
2) Hyper-parameter tuning for best models: From the
previous performance evaluations, we select RandomForest,
ExtraTrees, and GradientBoosting classifiers for the hyper-
parameter tuning phase for site classification detection. For
requests, we select Random Forest and Extra Trees classifiers.
We perform a grid search optimization for all of them
regarding F1 score. The parameter setting that gave the best
results on the training data are shown in Table II.
3) Model combination: Now, we have a set of closely well-
performing models for detecting site and requests linked to
CNAME cloaking-based tracking. In order to balance out their
individual weaknesses, we combine conceptually different
machine learning classification algorithms and and use the sum
of predicted probabilities to predict the class labels.
We thus use VotingClassifier with soft voting to combine
the predictions coming from the following supervised classi-
fication algorithms: RandomForest, ExtraTrees, and Gradient-
Boosting for detecting sites, and RandomForest and ExtraTrees
for detecting requests. The performance of separate algorithms
and the combined model are discussed in the next section.
TABLE II
BEST PARAMETER SETTINGS IN TRAINING PHASE REGARDING F1 SCORE.
Algorithm Parameter Site Request
Random max features 1 1
Forest min samples split 8 2
min samples leaf 3 1
n estimators 100 300
Extra max features 10 1
Trees min samples split 2 2
min samples leaf 3 1
n estimators 300 100
Gradient max features 0.3 Not selected
Boosting min samples leaf 100
n estimators 300
learning rate 0.2
max depth 8
IV. CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We evaluate our model and feature importance regarding
detection of CNAME cloaking-based tracking. We also inves-
tigate concept drift using our datasets from 2018 to 2020.
A. General results
1) The performance of model: The results obtained using
the test set for sites and requests linked to CNAME cloaking-
based tracking detection on 20% of the 2020 dataset (preserved
for this test) are shown in Table III and Table IV. We first
show that the F1 score of all classification algorithms improve
slightly after the hyper-parameter tuning for both sites and
request. Next, the combined model achieves 0.790 of F1 score
for detecting sites and 0.885 of F1 score for detecting requests.
These results show that the combination model exhibit similar
performance to other classifiers regarding detection of sites
linked to CNAME cloaking based-tracking, but that combined
model works better for detecting requests. In order to ease
following result comparison, we use the combined models for
further analyses.
Checking false negatives, we find that some sites/requests
linked to CNAME cloaking have the same attributes with
sites/requests without CNAME cloaking based tracking. For
example, the healthpartners.com linked to tracking provider
Adobe, with only six scripts and the proportion XML-
HttpRequest in this site is 0.07. For request, the request
https://gjr5.yoigo.com/ea.js points to tracking provider Eule-
rian; its prefix gjr5 is not in the blacklists and it does not
contain any user identification. However, we believe that if
we crawl more data with the request linked to track provider
Eulerian, we can classify this request as CNAME cloaking-
based tracking.
TABLE III
RESULTS OBTAINED USING THE TEST SET FOR SITE LINKED TO CNAME
CLOAKING-BASED TRACKING DETECTION.
Score RandomForest ExtraTree GradientBoosting Combined
Default/Tuned Default/Tuned Default/Tuned
Precision 0.777/0.784 0.771/0.763 0.781/0.801 0.794
Recall 0.730/0.748 0.736/0.770 0.779/0.782 0.785
F1 score 0.753/0.766 0.753/0.766 0.780/0.791 0.790
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(a) Site linked to CNAME cloaking-based tracking.
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(b) Request linked to CNAME cloaking-based tracking.
Fig. 3. The F1 score for the 10 selected classification algorithms using 10-fold stratified cross-validation in 2020 dataset regarding the detection of CNAME
cloaking-based tracking. The mean and standard deviation are computed on the 10 folds of the cross-validation.
TABLE IV
RESULTS OBTAINED USING THE TEST SET FOR REQUEST LINKED TO
CNAME CLOAKING-BASED TRACKING DETECTION.
Score Random Forest ExtraTree Combined
Default/Tuned Default/Tuned
Precision 0.940/0.935 0.928/0.949 0.949
Recall 0.807/0.830 0.811/0.802 0.828
F1 score 0.869/0.879 0.866/0.870 0.885
2) Comparison with the well-known tracking filter lists: To
block CNAME cloaking-based tracking without DNS resolu-
tion, well-known tracking filter lists such as the EasyPrivacy
list and the AdGuard tracking filter list include the first-party
subdomains which are fronts for CNAME cloaking. We com-
pare the request detection performance between our machine
learning approach and these tracking filter lists in Table V. We
confirm that our method outperforms the evaluated blocking
lists. Meanwhile, almost all browsers (except Firefox) do not
provide a DNS resolution API which is critical CNAME
cloaking-based tracking detection [18]. Beyond automating
blacklist building, our approach is thus especially helpful to
block CNAME cloaking-based tracking.
TABLE V
A COMPARISON OF REQUEST DETECTION PERFORMANCE.
Method Precision Recall F1 score
Machine learning 0.949 0.828 0.885
Easy Privacy list 0.880 0.721 0.792
Adguard tracking filter 0.918 0.417 0.574
B. Feature permutation importance
We investigate the permutation importance [26] to discuss
the feature importance of the selected classifier.
Figure 4(a) represents the feature permutation importance
regarding site detection. We observe that the number of script
(num script) and the proportion of XMLHttpRequest requests
(pct xhr) are the most useful features. In addition, tracking
providers are spread across different types of sites [18],
site category (category) and site country (country) are thus
not helpful in detecting sites with CNAME cloaking-related
tracking occurring.
Figure 4(b) shows the feature permutation importance of the
model for detecting the requests. The result reveals that the
length of request URL (len url) has the highest importance.
We assume that almost requests with a subdomain used for
CNAME cloaking-based tracking have a bigger length than
the request used for collecting content of site, because they
contain user identification. Also, the subdomain prefix length
(len prefix sub), the XHR usage request (is xhr), and the
randomness of URL request (entropy url) are discriminative
features for request detection. In addition to that, the sub-
domain prefix blacklist presence (prefix sub blacklist) is not
effective to detect requests. This is because some publishers
also use the same subdomain prefix that is used for both
CNAME cloaking and other non-tracking resources.
C. Concept drift analysis
Finally, we investigate the ability to detect sites and requests
related to CNAME cloaking-based tracking in the latest dataset
(2020) using a model trained on the old dataset (2018). We
use the 2018 dataset to train a model and test it on new data
collected in 2020 (Table I). We apply the method explained in
§ III-D to build a model and obtain the results in Table VI.
TABLE VI
RESULTS OBTAINED USING THE NEW SITE/REQUEST IN 2020 DATASET TO
EVALUATE 2018 DATASET MODEL.
Instance type Precision Recall F1 score
Site 0.608 0.787 0.686
Request 0.935 0.558 0.699
Our result shows that the performance degradation is lim-
ited. Specifically, F1 score for sites with CNAME cloaking-
related tracking decreases by 0.104, and by 0.186 for requests.
To explain this degradation, we examine the 2018 and 2020
datasets. In 2018, we do not see many random subdomain
prefixes and short requests, while it is the case in 2020. For
sites, we observe a decreasing number of requests, including
third and first-party request for each site in the 2020 dataset.
These changes can be plausible reasons for the degradation in
our model. Besides that, with rapid changes of web technology,
tracking providers might also adjust their target site and change
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(a) Site linked to CNAME cloaking-based tracking.
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(b) Request linked to CNAME cloaking-based tracking.
Fig. 4. Permutation importance of the combined model for CNAME cloaking-related tracking occurring. The box extends from the lower to upper quartile
values of the data, with a line at the median. The number of times a feature is randomly shuffled is n repeats = 10.
the implementation methods to deploy CNAME cloaking-
based tracking. Although the performance degradation is lim-
ited between 2018 and 2020, periodic model retraining can
alleviate this problem if more detection accuracy is required.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Recently, CNAME cloaking-based tracking on the web has
attracted much attention. The current best countermeasure,
blacklist approach, strongly dependant on realtime name res-
olution. In this paper, we proposed a machine learning ap-
proach to detect sites and HTTP requests containing CNAME
cloaking-based tracking. Through the comprehensive analysis,
we demonstrated the effectiveness of our method.
The proposed method complements existing techniques for
CNAME cloaking-based tracking detection and it can help re-
searchers, browser extensions developers, and blacklist main-
tainers to build highly effective systems against this tracking
technique. Once tracking providers know the existence of the
proposed detection methodology, they could attempt to evade
it. In future work, we intend to add new features to improve
our detection performance.
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